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WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD REAFFIRM THE
“FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET” PRESUMPTION IN SECURITIES
FRAUD CASES
Jonathan Massey∗
On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in one of the most
important securities law cases in decades: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund, No. 13-317. The defendant company in the case, Halliburton, is asking
the Court to overturn its landmark 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
which adopted a rule known as the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption,
enabling securities fraud class action lawsuits to be brought.1
The “fraud-on-the-market” rule is a rebuttable presumption that securities
prices in an open and developed market like the New York Stock Exchange
reflect material public information and that investors rely on the integrity of
the market price.2 Under this presumption, investors who bought or sold stock
during the relevant time period are able to bring their fraud claims without
proving that they personally knew of and relied on a misrepresentation in
making their decision to buy or sell.3 It’s assumed that the information (or
omission) is “baked into” the market price.4
Halliburton contends that the Court should overrule Basic and eliminate the
fraud-on-the-market presumption.5 Here’s why it is wrong:
• There has always been bipartisan support for the presumption. In 1988,
the SEC (under the Reagan Administration) urged the Supreme Court to adopt
the fraud-on-the-market presumption and warned that, without it, private
securities actions would face insuperable hurdles.6 In 1995, when Republicans
held a majority in both houses, Congress considered proposals to abolish the
∗ Jonathan Massey is a partner in the firm of Massey & Gail LLP, where he specializes in appellate and
complex litigation. He filed an amicus brief on behalf of a group of civil procedure scholars supporting the plaintiff
in the 2014 Halliburton case.
1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sep. 9,
2013).
2 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 246 (1988).
3 See id. at 245–50.
4 Id. at 246.
5 Petition for Writ, supra note 1.
6 Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 163
(2009).
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fraud-on-the-market presumption and warned that, without it, private securities
actions would face insuperable hurdles.7 In 1995, when Republicans held a
majority in both houses, Congress considered and rejected proposals to abolish
the fraud-on-the-market presumption.8 Today, the SEC continues to support
the fraud-on-the-market presumption and filed a brief in Halliburton strongly
expressing that view.9 Congress and the SEC are better able than the Court to
evaluate the defendants’ policy objections to the presumption.
• Numerous other groups and scholars filed briefs in Halliburton
defending the presumption.10 AARP filed a brief stressing the dangers to
consumers and investors if the presumption were eliminated.11 Fourteen
academic economists, including Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago
(who shared in last year’s Nobel Prize), submitted a brief supporting the
presumption.12 More than two-dozen other scholars did so as well.13 Charles
Fried, the former solicitor general who represented the SEC in 1988, filed a
brief twenty-six years later urging the Court to adhere to its prior decision in
Basic as a matter of stare decisis.14 Former SEC Chairmen William H.
Donaldson and Arthur Levitt, Jr. agreed,15 as did twenty-one states and the
territory of Guam.16
• Stare decisis principles are particularly forceful in non-constitutional
cases, where Congress is free to alter the Court’s decisions if it wishes.17 Here,
there is no basis for departing from Basic.18 Halliburton’s legal arguments are
largely recycled from the dissenting opinion in Basic by Justices White and
O’Connor.19 The Court rejected those arguments in 1988, and they are no more
persuasive now.20
7

Id.
Brief in Opposition at 32, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sep. 9, 2013).
9 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG (2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/halliburton-co-v-erica-p-john-fund-inc/.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae With Respect to Stare Decisis in Support of Respondent at 4–8,
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/halliburton-co-v-erica-p-john-fund-inc/.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
8
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• Meanwhile, Basic has become a firmly settled, indispensable part of
securities law. Without the fraud-on-the-market presumption, securities class
actions would face enormous hurdles, because each individual stockholder
would have to show that he or she knew of and relied on the misrepresentation,
and the case could not be tried in class form. Millions of investors would be
left without a remedy, because the costs of trying individual claims would
exceed the potential damages.
• Even separate suits by large institutional investors rely on the fraud-onthe-market presumption, so overturning Basic would threaten individual suits
by investors as well as class actions.
• Institutional investors increasingly use passive investment strategies
(such as index investing) that rely on the integrity of the market (within the
meaning of Basic) and the presumption that relevant public information is
incorporated into price.21 These investment strategies are built on the bedrock
premise that prices reflect available public information. If the Supreme Court
were suddenly to hold that this assumption is false, it would call into question
the central pillar of many investing strategies.22 Institutional investors
representing millions of pension beneficiaries and over $1.36 trillion of assets
under management warned the Supreme Court in the Halliburton case that
overturning Basic would force the re-evaluation of many settled investment
practices and the adoption of new and unpredictable guidelines.23 At the very
least, institutional investors would face a host of additional burdens and
expenses, because they would be forced to collect and review the disclosures
of thousands of companies if they sought to retain any possibility of asserting a
fraud claim by showing the kind of individualized “eyeball” reliance that
Halliburton argues is required. Institutional investors have warned that this
might lead them to narrow their portfolios and increase risk.24
• Without the important check provided by Basic and private securities
actions, the integrity of U.S. capital markets will be diminished, and investor
confidence in the fundamental fairness of the financial system will decline.

21 Lisa Gilbert & Jonathan Massey, What’s Right With Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Response to the
U.S. Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform, 2014 PUB. CITIZEN, U.S. CHAMBER WATCH REPORT 1, 4.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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Studies show that private actions play a key role in deterring securities fraud.25
For example, one recent study by Stephen Choi, professor of law at NYU, and
A.C. Pritchard, professor of law at the University of Michigan, found that
private class actions are more effective than SEC investigations at deterring
securities fraud and lead to a higher incidence of top officer resignations.26
Another study by Jonathan M. Karpoff of the University of Washington, D.
Scott Lee of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and Gerald S. Martin of
American University examined data from 1978 through 2004 and confirmed
the importance of private actions.27
• Private actions are also far more effective at returning compensation to
victims than government suits.28 For example, in actions against Enron and
aiders and abettors in the Enron fraud, the SEC recovered $440 million while
investors recovered about $7.3 billion from private suits.29 The SEC settlement
fund in connection with WorldCom was $750 million—at the time the largest
in the agency’s history compared to $6.1 billion recovered in the private
action.30 Notably, the private settlement with WorldCom included $24.25
million from individual directors, while the SEC fine was paid only by the
company.31
• Regulation of financial markets in the U.S. actually enhances its
competitive position against other markets. Recent studies have found that
foreign companies listing their stocks on their home exchanges and in the
United States are able to raise capital on better terms, at a lower net cost than
companies that list only outside the United States.32 Economists refer to this as
25 Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical
Comparison, 1 (N.Y. Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 12-38, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109739.
26

Id.
Jonathan M Karpoff et al., The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation, 3 (Working Paper, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333.
28 Compare Securities and Exchange Commission, Enron, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(May,14,2007) http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/enron.htm, with Kristen Hays, Enron Settlement: $7.2
Billion to Shareholders, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Sep. 9, 2008), http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Enronsettlement-7-2-billion-to-shareholders-1643123.php.
29 Id.
30 Compare AccountingWeb, $750 Million MCI/WorldCom Settlement is Largest in SEC History,
ACCOUNTINGWEB (Jul. 7, 2003) http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/750-million-mciworldcom-settlementlargest-sec-history, with Settlements, WORLDCOM SECURITIES LITIGATION (visited Jan. 5, 2014),
http://www.worldcomlitigation.com/html/citisettlement.html. The website http://www.worldcomlitigation.com is the
information site administered by Lead Counsel.
31 Id.
32 Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign
Listing Choices Over Time 5, 29 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2007-03-012, 2007), available at
27
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a cross-listing premium.33 By contrast, companies that cross-list in their home
exchanges and London, which is widely recognized to have less rigorous
regulations than the United States, do not enjoy the cross-listing premium.34
This premium exists in the United States because of the superior protections
that the regulatory regime in the United States provides investors.35
• After the financial crisis of 2008, many small investors fled U.S. stock
markets out of concern that the system was stacked against them. Many such
investors are only now beginning to return. The Supreme Court should not
create a major roadblock to private securities fraud actions, given the important
enforcement role it plays in assuring investor confidence.
• The SEC simply does not have the resources to police the markets
without the essential supplement of private securities litigation. The drastic
expansion of the SEC’s responsibilities under Dodd-Frank and other laws,
coupled with the astonishing growth of trading technologies and strategies,
means that the SEC cannot be the sole entity responsible for the enforcement
of the nation’s securities laws. The SEC’s responsibilities have come at the
cost of enforcement of securities laws, particularly in a time of budgetary
sequester and government shutdown. In the words of one federal judge, “the
SEC has been hard hit by budget limitations,” which have forced the agency to
husband its resources and instead “to focus on the smaller, easily resolved
cases that will beef up their statistics when they go to Congress begging for
money.”36
• The evidence also demonstrates that the criticisms of private securities
actions are exaggerated. For example, the so-called “in terrorem” effect of
securities class actions is not supported by the data: 77 percent of securities
class actions are resolved before a motion for class certification is even filed.37
NERA Economic Consulting “did not find reliable statistical relationships

http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=982193; Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity
Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulations Matter?, 44 J. OF ACCOUNTING RES. 485, 485 (2006).
33 Id. at 30.
34 Id. at 31.
35 Id. at 29.
36 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisiswhy-no-executive-prosecutions/.
37 Renzo Comolli et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2012 Full-Year Review 20,
NERA (2013), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_2012_1113.pdf.
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between the resolution of a motion for class certification and expected
settlements.”38
Summary: Private securities lawsuits play a vital role in enforcing the
federal securities laws. They deter wrongdoing, compensate investors, and help
ensure the integrity of the capital markets. The SEC cannot perform the job
alone. There is bipartisan recognition of the importance of private lawsuits, and
the Supreme Court should reaffirm the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption.

38 Ronald I. Miller, Dynamic Litigation Analysis: Predicting Securities Class Action Settlements as a Case
Evolves, NERA (2013), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Dynamic_Litigation_Analysis_0114.pdf.

